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abstraCt
Password sharing is a common security problem. Some application domains are more exposed than others 
and, by dealing with very sensitive information, the healthcare domain is definitely not exempt from this 
problem. This chapter presents a case study of a cross section of how healthcare professionals actually 
deal with password authentication in typical real world scenarios. It then compares the professionals’ 
actual practice with what they feel about password sharing and what are the most frequent problems 
associated with it. Further, this chapter discusses and suggests how to solve or minimize some of these 
problems using both technological and social cultural mechanisms.
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introduCtion
Health care is an industry sector considered to 
be exposed to high risks regarding information 
security. Nevertheless, today’s technology and 
good practices provide a range of controls to 
mitigate (up to a certain level) most of those 
risks, especially those related to electronic 
health records. The biggest risk faced is a lack 
of understanding of the complex environments 
that our health services present and ensuring that 
users understand and comply with local policies. 
Convergence towards a viable universal solution 
is not imminent. Therefore trust in e-health is 
decidedly more fragile as compared with many 
other industry sectors. This can be explained by 
the constant challenges in system interconnectiv-
ity and an environment of continual changes in 
legislation (Croll & Croll, 2006).
A hospital is an environment in which sensi-
tive information is the base of clinical decisions, 
so there is the need for a correct balance between 
the usability of information technologies and the 
security of the information (Kurtz, 2003). Hos-
pital Information Systems (HIS) need to tackle 
security concerns regarding confidentiality (e.g. 
access control, and secure communications), 
integrity (e.g. data consistency, error correction, 
redundancy, and accidental or malicious altera-
tions) and availability (e.g. continuous access to 
information by authorised users).
Confidentiality, which involves access control 
and secure communications, has been defined 
as ensuring that information is accessible only 
to those authorised to have access (ISO, 2000).
Access control relates specifically to confiden-
tiality, and is a step performed after the identifi-
cation and authentication of users is finished. Its 
purpose is to guard access to the patient records 
in the Information Systems (IS). Access control 
should start with a clear and succinct definition of 
an access policy (Blobel, 2000). This may seem 
easy to achieve, but usually does not exist, either 
because it can be very complex or simply because 
no one thought it was necessary to articulate it. In 
the healthcare environment, processes and people 
acting upon them may change very often and are, 
therefore, difficult to track. The primary cause of 
security breaches is insiders and the consequences 
in a healthcare environment can be more damaging 
than in any other organisation. Security should 
enable and not intrude in the daily workflow; 
otherwise people will try to bypass it just to do 
their work more easily. So, it is very important 
to assess and understand the reality of a working 
environment in a hospital.
Of the few published studies on the specific 
issue of password management and security in 
healthcare systems, a previous survey (Stanton 
& Stam, 2005) showed that end users do not 
comply with the regular security procedures that 
are necessary to keep their user accounts’ infor-
mation safe. This behaviour is closely related to 
the organization goals, so end users from orga-
nizations whose missions depend mainly upon 
security, behave better in performing security 
procedures. Nevertheless, training, awareness 
and knowledge of monitoring can also help in 
improving users’ behaviour. Unfortunately, the 
downside of this is the fact that end users need to 
remember their chosen or assigned passwords so 
they tend to write them somewhere in order not to 
forget them. Furthermore, all the awareness and 
training of end users seems to be of little effect 
when it comes to password sharing behaviours.
This chapter addresses the topic of password 
sharing as follows. The Background section 
introduces some concepts related to Electronic 
Medical Record security. Password Sharing sec-
tion confronts and analyses case study results 
of what happens in practice in terms of sharing 
passwords. It then compares this to what the 
healthcare professionals say happens and what 
their opinions and views on these issues are. The 
next section (Discussion and Recommendations) 
discusses the results in more detail and presents 
some recommendations for possible solutions to 
the problem of password sharing, in terms of both 
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technological and social and cultural changes. The 
chapter ends with the conclusions of this research.
baCkground
information security
Information security is usually defined by three 
main characteristics: confidentiality as the pre-
vention of unauthorized disclosure of informa-
tion; integrity as the prevention of unauthorized 
modification of information; and availability as 
the prevention of unauthorized withholding of 
information or resources (Gollman, 1999; Harris, 
2003). In specific environments, like healthcare, 
some authors and even standards like the ISO 
27000 family, highlight other security properties, 
like Authenticity (the clear identification of the 
author of a piece of information), but these can 
usually be considered as variants of the three main 
properties (e.g. authenticity can be considered to be 
part of integrity (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007). An-
other important variant is the difference between 
privacy and confidentiality. Privacy relates to the 
right an individual to protect his or her private 
information from unwarranted disclosure, whilst 
confidentiality relates to the provision of mecha-
nisms to protect information from unauthorized 
access (Gollman, 1999).
The complexity of information security sys-
tems make it very difficult to build a fully secure 
system (Schneier, 2004). This complexity is related 
to 3 contributing factors: the technology itself and 
the risks inherent in using it; the difficulty of clas-
sifying information in terms of both organization 
and users’ security requirements; and facilitating 
the ease of understanding and use of the infor-
mation technology by humans. The end users of 
the system are usually not technological experts 
and this is one of the most problematic factor to 
consider (Schneier, 2004) when it comes to ac-
cess control. These contributing factors coupled 
with the fact that attackers are always finding new 
ways to exploit potential vulnerabilities in existing 
technology make it very difficult to build secure 
information systems. To make matters worse, 
potential solutions often have conflicting aims, 
for example: assuring the privacy of information, 
whilst needing to be able to access it for audit or 
law enforcement purposes; making it easy for an 
authorised user to gain access to information but 
complex for an unauthorised one.
electronic medical record - emr
A patient record is a set of documents containing 
clinical and administrative information regarding 
one particular patient. It supports communication 
and decision making in daily practice, and is used 
by different users for different purposes (Wyatt, 
1994). It exists to memorise and communicate 
the data existing on a particular individual, in 
order to help deliver care to him or her. Records 
are not only an information resource but also a 
communication mechanism which enables com-
munication between health professionals and 
between the past and the present (Dick & Steen, 
1997) (Nygran, Wyatt & Wright, 1998). Patient 
records, the patient and published best practice 
are the three sources needed for the practice of 
evidence-based medicine (Wyatt & Wright, 1998). 
They are used for immediate clinical decisions 
(either by the author, or by others), future clinical 
decisions, quality improvement, education, clini-
cal research, management and reimbursement, and 
to act as evidence in a court case (Wyatt, 2005). 
Many different names are given when patient 
records are computerised. Some of the acronyms 
found in the literature are confusing and others 
are redundant. Terms like Computerised Patient 
Record (CPR), Computerised Medical Record 
(CMR), Patient Health Record (PHR), Electronic 
Medical Record (EMR) and Electronic Patient 
Record (EPR) have been used in the past. Elec-
tronic Health Record (EHR) has turned out to be 
the most generic term, although each one of the 
others represents a different concept in the current 
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understanding of EHR (Waegemann, 2002). This 
chapter uses the term Electronic Medical Record 
(EMR), which means an organised collection of all 
medical records about an individual patient stored 
in the various computer systems and databases of 
all the providers who have provided health care 
to that patient within their organisation.
For decades, medical records’ technology was 
remarkably stagnant. Occasional breakthroughs 
consisted of new systems of colour-coded chart 
tags and rolling lateral file cabinets (Bodenheimer 
& Grumbach, 2003). In 1997 it was stated that 
after 30 years of work and millions of dollars in 
research and implementation of computer systems 
in healthcare in the USA, patient records were 
still predominantly paper records (Dick &Steen, 
1997). Between 1991 and 1998 the European 
Union provided 47 Million Euros of direct fund-
ing support to research projects on EMRs whose 
budgets totalled 76 Million Euros (Iakovidis, 
1998). As a result of some of these efforts, EMRs 
were implemented in the healthcare institutions of 
each country, although at very different speeds. 
During the 80s and the 90s the free market in 
provision gave rise to a considerable fragmenta-
tion (Beolchi, 2002).
Generically the main requirements an elec-
tronic medical record must fulfil are:
• be fast enough to give instantaneous 
replies;
• have a simple interface, which is easy to 
use;
• be trustworthy regarding the information it 
delivers;
• be versatile to adapt itself to user 
requirements;
• be extensible to include new features as 
they arise.
problems of emr Confidentiality 
and healthcare professionals
The introduction of EMR systems within 
healthcare organizations has the main goal of 
integrating heterogeneous patient information 
that is usually scattered over different locations 
(Waegemann, 2003; Cruz-Correia et al, 2005). 
This is why the EMR is becoming an essential 
source of information and an important support 
tool for the healthcare professional. There is also 
an increasing need to access healthcare informa-
tion at remote locations (MRI, 2005). This and 
the distributed nature of the information stress the 
need for information security requirements to be 
taken seriously (Bakker, 2004).
One obstacle mentioned by healthcare profes-
sionals for the use and integration of EMR within 
healthcare is the lack of controls to assure patient 
privacy (Knitz, 2005). As stated earlier, in order to 
protect a patient’s privacy it is essential to at least 
provide for information confidentiality. Healthcare 
professionals report that using EMR has problems 
in terms of security due to its ease of distribution 
and wider online access (Miller, Hillman & Given, 
2004). If they do not comprehend the technology 
or how the system can or cannot protect patient 
information it will be more difficult for them to 
agree on using it, or to help improve its flaws and 
integrate it efficiently within their daily work.
On the other hand, healthcare professionals 
normally bypass system controls in order to has-
ten and make the completion of their tasks easier 
(Lehoux, 2006) (Adams & Sasse, 1999). When 
they do this, they do not realize that they could be 
doing more harm than good. Sharing passwords is 
similar to sharing identities, to masquerading as 
another identity and performing tasks as another 
person. So anyone that is using another person’s 
password will be associated to that identity. When 
something wrong happens, when for example 
someone inserted the wrong information about a 
patient’s medication and the patient gets worse, 
who is the responsible party? If multiple human 
users are using the same user account, then the audit 
trail is unable to determine precisely which human 
user did what to which information and when. It 
thus becomes impossible to find the source of any 
security breach. However, the account holder – the 
person to whom the username and password was 
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originally issued – will be held responsible if he/
she was supposed to be the sole user of the account 
and password sharing is officially forbidden by 
the organization. In this case this user is officially 
the only person using that username/password 
combination. Users typically will not want to be 
held responsible for unauthorized actions that 
they have not undertaken, and once this is made 
known to them, they will be unlikely to want to 
share their account passwords again.
Users usually have no problem in understand-
ing that certain computer accounts should only be 
accessed by themselves and that their usernames 
and passwords should not be divulged to anyone 
else. If you ask users if they would be willing 
to give their bank debit or credit card and PIN 
number to someone else, they would invariably 
say “certainly not”. Thus they have no problem 
in understanding that some accounts should be 
for their sole use only.
Password sharing may happen if there is the 
assumption that only registered healthcare pro-
fessionals are using the system. But are they the 
only users? How can the systems’ administrators 
check if there are no intruders in the system if 
everyone uses the same identity? The current user 
may be someone from outside that is trying to do 
harm. The intruder may only access confidential 
information but could, even worse, change and/
or delete it. Sharing passwords distributes them 
and makes it easier for them to be discovered by 
outsiders or by insiders that are not authorized 
to access the EMR. It is therefore not only bad 
practise but also potentially dangerous practise.
Password sharing in healthcare needs a proper 
study and improvements in password usage must 
be properly adapted to the human users of EMR 
as well as to the technical functionalities of the 
EMR itself. The next section presents two studies 
that help to understand what really happens in 
practice regarding sharing passwords and reveals 
what healthcare professionals’ feel about it.
passWord sharing
This section presents a review of published studies 
about password sharing from the healthcare prac-
tice and from healthcare professionals’ perspec-
tives. It also includes results from an analysis of 
user access logs of a real EMR system as well as 
from studies that explored the users’ perceptions 
and opinions in relation to password sharing.
literature review
A literature review was performed according to 
the following steps:
1.  Build search queries to select published 
articles of the subject in study (see Table 1).
2.  Filter the published papers based on their 
titles and abstracts.
3.  Select related papers and papers that are 
referenced by the ones selected in B.
4.  Get the full papers.
5.  Read and summarize the full papers.
A large number of papers regarding password 
sharing and password authentication problems 
were found in the initial search (see Table 1). 
From this list of papers there was a further se-
lection in order to choose the papers relating to 
healthcare practice as well as papers regarding 
healthcare professionals’ perspectives and views 
on these topics.
For the healthcare practice theme, from the 
183 papers obtained from the search, after per-
forming steps A to E, only 10 papers were se-
lected for review, from which 9 full papers were 
obtained. From these 9 papers, 5 papers were 
found from the initial search queries while 4 
papers were found as references in step C. 5 of 
the 9 papers were directly related to the healthcare 
domain while 4 were from different domains.
For the healthcare professionals’ perspec-
tives in relation to password sharing, 10 papers 
were selected for review. 9 papers were directly 
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selected from the search queries while 1 was se-
lected from referenced articles (step C). Only 8 
full papers were obtained, read and summarized. 
From these 8 papers, only 7 papers were included 
in this review (one of the papers related to the 
professionals practice and not to their views and 
perspectives on the subject) - 3 papers related 
to the healthcare domain while the other 4 were 
related to other domains.
In Table 2 and Table 3: * refers to papers not 
from the healthcare domain; + refers to papers 
obtained not directly from the search query.
What happens in practice
Results from the literature review, regarding 
password sharing in healthcare practice, showed 
that for most healthcare information systems, 
passwords are the first line of defence in keeping 
patient and administrative records private and 
secure. However, this defence is only as strong as 
the passwords employees choose to use. In more 
detail, the published articles focused mainly on 
three themes that are discussed below: password 
sharing, constraints of the healthcare domain and 
attitudes of healthcare professionals.
Password Sharing
A U.S. survey of non-malicious, low technical 
knowledge behaviour related to password creation 
and sharing showed that password “hygiene” (i.e. 
the good practices to use passwords) was generally 
poor but varied substantially across different orga-
nization types (e.g., military organizations versus 
telecommunications companies) (Stanton & Stam, 
2005). The set of studied items included three items 
pertaining to password management behaviour 
(e.g., frequency of changing the password), three 
items pertaining to password sharing behaviour 
(e.g., sharing with others in the work group) and 
three items pertaining to organizational support 
of security-related behaviour (e.g. “My company/
org. provides training programs to help employees 
improve their awareness”). Their results showed 
that improvements in basic hygiene behaviours 
(e.g., frequent changes to one’s password) are 
associated with training, awareness, knowledge 
of monitoring, and rewards; on the other hand, 
researchers did not find improvement in relation 
to password sharing behaviours.
Current systems for banking authentication 
require that customers do not reveal their access 
codes, even to their family members. A study of 
banking and security in Australia showed that the 
practice of sharing passwords does not conform 
to this requirement (Singh et al, 2007). For mar-
ried and de facto couples, password sharing is 
seen as a practical way of managing money and 
a demonstration of trust. Sharing Personal Iden-
tification Numbers (PINs) is a common practice 
among remote indigenous communities in Aus-
tralia. In areas with poor banking access, this is 
the only way to access cash. People with certain 
disabilities have to share passwords with carers, 
and PIN numbers with retail clerks.



















“authentication password” problems 39
Total 183
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Constraints of the Healthcare Domain
The access to patient data is not as simple as it may 
appear at first glance. The processes of healthcare 
delivery are very dynamic, and so some authors 
claim that the problem of access control with 
access control mechanisms (ACM) is too rigid 
to represent the staff’s role and affiliate/member-
ship in the complex real world. Consequently, it 
Table 2. Summary of objectives and methods from the reviewed papers 
Paper Objective Methods & participants Year
A
Find a better solution for user authentication besides 
passwords
Survey 2003
B Collect problems from users and staff Online tracking system - 278 2007
C
Investigate the use of the digital pen (DP) system to col-
lect data in a clinical trial.
Qualitative (semi-structured interviews; focus group) 
Quantitative (questionnaire) - 134
2008
D*
Assess how people deal with money and banking in the 
context of their relationships




Family Accounts - a new user account model for shared 
home computers
Group interview; system use; questionnaires – 38 2008
F* Assess students’ best practices on password security Survey 2008
G*+
Assess user behaviours and perceptions relating to 
password systems
Web based questionnaire – 139 1999
Table 3. Summary of the problems and solutions and/or recommendations relating to passwords 
Paper Problems Possible solutions and/or recommendations
A The need to remember multiple passwords Single sign on with biometrics
B 4% (11 reports) were password problems (forget password or 
application not available on all computers)
Improve future implementations based on paper obtained 
results
C Most of the technical problems of the system occurred during 
setup-password access
Improve future systems based on paper obtained results
D* Sharing of passwords Design security systems for banking based on observed social 
and cultural practices of password and pin sharing
E* • A family who used password-protected profiles mentioned 
that everyone except the mother had forgotten their 
passwords, so they relied on her to remain logged in.
• Only one study participant claimed to never use someone 
else’s profile, while seven of nineteen (37%) claimed to 
use someone else’s profile at least weekly.
• A majority of the participants in the multiple profiles group 
mentioned that they use other family members’ profiles 
for quick tasks due to convenience, if the computer is 
already logged in.
This user account model is the most appropriate model for 
using shared computers
F* Passwords have many problems Practices and attitudes should be improved; develop a web ap-
plication to help students gaining experience with passwords
G*+ 4 major factors influence effective password use: 
multiple passwords; password content; perceived compatibil-
ity with work practices; users’ perceptions of organizational 
security and information sensitivity
• Designers of security mechanisms are the key to suc-
cessful security systems;
• Unless security departments understand how the mecha-
nisms they design are used in practice, there will remain 
the danger that mechanisms that look secure on paper 
will fail in practice
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may have been natural for a hospital to prioritize 
resolving that problem.
To Hirose (Hirose, 1998), this problem is 
caused by the security system representing neither 
the patient-doctor relation nor the clinical situa-
tion at the points of care. He suggested that one 
possible solution to this problem is to implement 
an access control method based on the “relation 
and situation” model on a multi-axial ACM. In 
his words, “our method holds user declaration of 
relation/situation as the access reason, then allows 
flexible data access as needed at the point-of-care. 
As the result, EMR system records (who, when, 
where, why, whose, what, and how) on each ac-
cess, and has the ability of accurately audit without 
any maintenance cost” (Hirose & Sasaki, 2001).
This interesting solution includes a health 
professional / patient relation and situation model 
that includes the following possible classifications:
• in charge of pre-examination
• in charge
• as a member of the treating team
• on behalf of (when the staff in charge is 
off duty)
• on night coverage
• as a request for consultation
• in an ambulance
• in an emergency
• as an auditor
Also it includes time classifications:
• constant (e.g. main doctor or treating team 
staff)
• periodical (e.g. anaesthetist or ICU staff)
• intermittent (e.g. some kinds of therapeutic 
support)
• unsettled (ex. consultation)
Attitudes of Healthcare Professionals
In a 2006 paper, Cazier et al. presented the results 
of a study of actual healthcare workers’ password 
practices (Lazier & Medlin, 2006). They have 
examined the passwords created by 90 employ-
ees of a healthcare agency through an empirical 
analysis of the passwords, the factors of length 
and strength. The results of this study show that 
a very small percentage of employees are using 
most of the best practices as recommended by 
governmental, educational and private organiza-
tions. Most users (64%) did not use both upper 
and lowercase passwords. The vast majority 
(78%) of those who do use upper and lowercase 
passwords, do so only in logical places, such as 
in capitalizing a name.
In addition to using a mix of upper- and low-
ercase letters, most experts recommend having a 
combination of letters and numbers. In this case, 
less than a fourth (24%) used both letters and 
numbers. Of those who used letters and numbers, 
the vast majority (82%) only used numbers at 
either the beginning or end of the word. Also, the 
great majority of the employees, 59%, appear to 
be using common words that can be found in any 
English language dictionary, thus making them 
very susceptible to dictionary attacks or password 
guessing. Of even greater concern, 43% of all 
passwords appear to be the name of a person. 
Another common threat is having the user name 
the same (4.4%) or similar (11%) to the password.
The authors concluded by stating that most 
employees in this healthcare agency were not very 
security savvy when they created their passwords. 
Also it appears that they do not completely un-
derstand the ramifications of a password breach 
(like possible access to patients’ accounts by a 
hacker) and how their choice of a weak password 
could affect the security of their agency’s system.
A Case Study
Methods
Three different Information Systems implemented 
in hospitals were used in this study: (1) a Virtual 
Patient Record (VPR), (2) an Obstetrics and Gyn-
aecology Departmental Patient Record (ObsGyn.
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care), and (3) a Hospital Information System (HIS). 
The first two information systems are being used 
in a Central Hospital with more than 1300 beds, 
whilst the third one is running in a smaller regional 
hospital with about 300 beds.
The accesses and actions taken place in each 
of these systems are logged in databases. The col-
lected log data of the three information systems 
referred to sessions from October 2004 until De-
cember 2007. The suspicious behaviour that was 
searched for was users working for more than 24 
hours (in some cases doctors work for 24 hours 
consecutively). All user sessions that started less 
than 10 hours from the end of the last session were 
considered to be referring to the same working day.
Results
The number of suspicious cases found in VPR was 
508; the calculated working days ranged from 24 
to 63 hours (average = 29 hours). These working 
days referred to 139 of 1434 logins (r
VPR
=9.7%). 
In 72 logins (r
VPR
1=5.0%) the suspicious behaviour 
only occurred once; in 57 logins (r
VPR
2=4.0%) oc-
curred 2 to 9 times; and in 10 logins (r
VPR
10=0.7%) 
occurred 10 to 56 times. The 10 logins that more 
frequently have suspicious behaviour referred to 
the following medical specialties: Anaesthesiol-
ogy (4 logins), Emergency (2 logins), Infectious 
Diseases (2 login), Cardiothoracic Surgery (1 
login), Gastroenterology (1 login).
Regarding ObsGyn.care, the number of suspi-
cious cases found was 58; the calculated working 
days ranged from 24 to 48 hours (average = 27.5 
hours). These working days referred to 28 of 266 
logins (r
O&G
=10.5%). In 16 logins (r
O&G
1=6.0%) 
the suspicious behaviour only occurred once; in 
12 logins (r
O&G
2=4.5%) occurred 2 to 9 times; and 
never (r
O&G
10=0%) occurred more than 10 times.
Regarding HIS, the number of suspicious 
cases found was 315; the calculated working 
days ranged from 24 to 91 hours (average = 34.5 
hours). The working days referred to 77 of 346 
logins (r
HIS
=22.3%). In 26 logins (r
HIS
1=7.5%) the 
suspicious behaviour only occurred once; in 43 
logins (r
HIS
2=12.4%) occurred from 2 to 9 times; 
and in 8 logins (r
HIS
10=2.3%) occurred from 10 
to 22 times.
The rate of suspicious cases is very similar in 





and is double in the HIS case (r
HIS
=22.3%). How-
ever, in the VPR there were more recurring cases 







Although technical solutions exist to provide se-
cure access control, they demand a clear definition 
of permissions for each group of actors. Healthcare 
organisations must comply with current legisla-
tion, ethical rules and internal processes, which 
are very difficult to objectively define as access 
control rules. The number of shared passwords 
found may probably just represent the tip of the 
iceberg. However, it is sufficient to generate ap-
prehension.
Table 4. Comparison of password sharing among three Information Systems; number and ratio per 
month of cases of suspected working days (SWD); number and percentage of suspected logins, and 
percentages grouped the frequency of SWDs 
Information 
System
SWD Suspicious Logins N (%)
N Per month Total Once Until 10 times 10 or more
VPR 508 14 139 (9.7) 72 (5.0) 57 (4.0) 10 (0.7)
ObsGyn.care 58 2 28 (11) 16 (6.0) 12 (4.5) 0 (0.0)
HIS 315 105 77 (22) 26 (7.5) 43 (12) 8 (2.3)
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The analyses of these results made the devel-
oper team of HIS change some features of the 
system, namely the creation of a timeout function 
so that the interface logs out automatically after a 
specific idle time. This way the interface locks out 
and makes the next user insert his/her credentials 
again. The plan is to make a new analysis of the 
HIS system in the future, in order to evaluate 




Results from the literature review, regarding 
healthcare professionals’ perspectives about 
password sharing, showed that in both healthcare 
and other domains, problems with password us-
age are very similar (Table 3 and Table 4). These 
include password sharing on a regular basis as 
well as password forgetting. Although most stud-
ies conclude that the obtained results will help to 
improve the design and definition of password 
authentication mechanisms, this can only be 
achieved if the development phases focus on end 
users’ needs and workflows. In order to further 
explore health care professionals’ perspectives 
a study was carried on. It included a qualitative 
method (focus groups) to gain lot of information 
regarding this issue, followed by a quantitative 
method (a structured questionnaire) to further 
explore specific issues that came up during the 
focus groups’ discussions.
Focus-Groups
The main objective of focus groups (FG) is to 
gather opinions and experiences related to specific 
topics. This is obtained through sampling groups 
(comprising 6 to 8 people) of the required popula-
tion, who meet to discuss a set of topics amongst 
themselves. The discussion can last on average 
from one to one and a half hours, and is guided by 
a skilled moderator who records the discussions. 




The selection of participants was made from 
postgraduate students at the Faculty of Medicine 
of the University of Porto. Students were chosen 
from the following Masters Courses: Medical 
Informatics and Evidence and Decision in Health-
care; and from the Doctoral Programs in Clinical 
Studies and Healthcare Services Research. Both 
healthcare professionals (HCPs) and informatics’ 
professionals are enrolled on the Masters Courses, 
but only HCPs were selected and put into groups 
according to their professional backgrounds (i.e. 
segmentation). One of these groups however had 
HCPs with mixed backgrounds. The doctoral 
program only enrols medical doctors and so these 
comprised one of the groups. The reason for 
grouping participants according to professional 
backgrounds facilitates discussions because all 
the participants in a group have similar experi-
ences and backgrounds, usually at the same level 
(Morgan, 1996).
The HCP were contacted and selected at the 
beginning of their courses (during their first 
lectures). They were gathered in a room without 
knowing that they were going to participate in a 
focus group or what the topic of discussion was 
going to be.
Line of Discussion
The list below presents the line of discussion that 
was followed by the moderator:
1.  The participants were given the main theme 
to discuss and other information regarding 
the process that would be followed during 
the course of the focus group. Each par-
ticipant was asked to give their consent to 
participating.
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2.  Each participant was initially asked to give 
details about their profession and work loca-
tion, as well as the use of EMR within their 
practice.
3.  After that they were all asked to discuss 
amongst themselves:
a.  The use of paper records or EMR, what 
are the advantages or disadvantages of 
each
b.  access control issues in general
c.  access control mechanisms they use 
on a daily basis when accessing any 
system
d.  the problems and benefits of giving dif-
ferent access levels to different groups 
of users
e.  access control policies to EMR: who 
defines them, what should be improved
At the end they were asked to give their opin-
ions about the best access control solutions they 
think should be used to control the access to EMR.
Data Collection and Analysis
Data was collected by audio recording the whole 
conversation while the conversations of the third 
and fourth group were also recorded with a video 
camera (see Table 5).
Regarding the analysis, only one person was 
involved during the whole process. The discus-
sions from each focus group were transcribed into 
4 separate word documents. Each document was 
then divided into smaller ones, containing only 
the dialogues belonging to each one of the par-
ticipants, so that the data could be more easily 
related to a specific participant.
All documents were inserted into the qualitative 
analysis software, QSR NVivo 7 (NVivo, 2009), 
and the coding was done using this tool to register 
and structure data in a more automatic way. The 
coding started after each focus group documents 
were generated and was done separately for each 
focus group.
The data analysis was performed in phases. 
In the first phase, codes were generated from the 
data itself (in vivo coding), using a line-by-line 
coding strategy. These codes comprise the core 
ideas that were found within the text. Line-by-line 
coding helps to identify gaps, define actions and 
explicate both actions and meanings and leads to 
developing theoretical categories. On a second 
phase, a more focused and structured coding was 
done and codes started to fit and be grouped into 
categories. The third phase was based on axial 
coding where relations between categories and 
sub-categories became more visible and so they 
were organized as such.
Results
Four groups were arranged with a total of 26 par-
ticipants: one group with 4 nurses (FG1), one group 
with 5 health technicians (FG2) (3 radiologists, 
1 pharmacist and 1 neurophysiologist), another 
group with 7 people from mixed backgrounds 
Table 5. Description of each focus group data collection 
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(FG3) (1 doctor, 3 nurses and 3 health technicians) 
and the last group with 10 medical doctors (FG4). 
Table 6 shows the participants’ affiliations.
Figure 1 shows one of the main categories 
(access control) and sub-categories related to the 
topic of shared logins and passwords that came 
up during the focus group discussions.
From all the focus group discussions 16 dif-
ferent people (6 nurses, 3 health technicians and 
7 doctors) talked about shared logins and pass-
words. 14 state that passwords are shared on a 
regular basis while 2 state that each professional 
has his own password and to use others they need 
to know them and it is their responsibility.
From the 14 that stated that passwords are 
shared on a regular basis: 3 people said that the 
professionals usually left the applications open and 
so others could still access and use the application 
with another person’s login and password; 3 people 
said they needed to use a colleague’s password 
because the system had some problems or theirs 
was not available at the moment; 2 people said 
that as they work in a team of two, they both used 
each other’s passwords at some point; 2 people 
said that there was an habit of password sharing 
within the clinical environment; 2 people said 
that it was common to enter several computers at 
the same time with the same password; 1 person 
said that some applications only needed a login to 
access while another said that there were usually 
generic passwords within the applications.
Some quotes from the focus groups discussions 
relating to password sharing:
“In the beginning I didn’t have a login, I had a col-
league beside me and I never used his credentials 
without him being around…” (nurse)
“…something that happened to me was that be-
cause the IT service was not available and did not 
give me a login and password, my superiors told 
me to use another person’s login and password…
this is not right is it? Because I’m recording 
Table 6.Healthcare institutions for the FG participants 
FG University hospital Health centre Hospital
Hospital centre 
(2 or more 
hospitals) Private clinic
FG1 1 1 2
FG2 2 2 1
FG3 1 1 3 1 1
FG4 4 1 1 4
TOTAL 8 3 8 6 1
Figure 1. Main category and sub-categories re-
lated to the topic of shared logins and passwords, 
generated from the focus groups discussions
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something I did in someone else’s name… it is 
ethically incorrect…” (nurse)
“…there is not much security at a clinical level…
there is the habit of using each others’ logins…” 
(technician)
“…It depends on the working team…where I work 
(health centre or hospital) no one is careful to 
keep their passwords secret…” (nurse)
“…people leave the applications open all the 
time…” (technician)
“…well, actually in my case, we usually work in 
pairs so the doctor with another team member…
so with my password or hers..it’s easier to medi-
cate the patient, to visit the patient…is easier…
”(doctor)-- “In my Unit is similar…” (nurse)
“…sometimes…to access the system we just need 
to provide the login…and it is possible, without a 
password..and is easy because the login everybody 
knows…it’s the ID number of the professional…” 
(nurse).
Discussion
Although healthcare professionals are bound to 
preserve patients’ confidentiality and deal with 
very sensitive information on a daily basis they 
refer that passwords are shared on a regularly so 
that they can perform their job more easily, or 
because they neglect the closing of the application 
they are using, or even because the system was 
unavailable and professionals needed to access it 
using other people’s credentials.
These results show not only problems related 
with the technology and system efficiency and 
performance, but also with human processes and 
workflows. These problems need to be addressed 
both in terms of making sure system availability is 
guaranteed for a 24/7 period as well as changing 
cultural and social interactions to guarantee that 
healthcare professionals have more difficulty in 
sharing their identity. This can be done by allowing 
them an easier and regular access to the systems, 
without hindering those from achieving their main 
goals (i.e. to treat patients with the best resources 
possible available) and making them bypass the 
security controls.
Structured Questionnaires
These are questionnaires containing different 
sets of questions, organized in a specific order. 
A sample of the population is selected and the 
questions are applied either face to face or people 
are left to complete them in their own time. The 
questionnaires can be oriented to focus on specific 
information. They can, for instance, be based on 
previously obtained information such as from 
focus group discussions, as they were in this 
specific study. The data is analysed quantitatively.
Methods
Construction of the Questionnaire
Questions were constructed based directly on the 
categories resulting from the focus groups, with 
the exception of Section 3 where the topics were 
related to legislation and patient rights to access 
their medical record. Section 3 also contained 
questions about a hypothetical scenario.
Population
Questionnaires were tested and corrected with 5 
different people from different backgrounds before 
they were applied to the population in the study.
Healthcare professionals from different health-
care institutions and backgrounds were approached 
in a random fashion at their working place during 
working hours. They were asked to answer the 
questionnaire and they could either refuse to do it, 
do it immediately or do it later in their own time.
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Data Collection and Analysis
Data was collected from the respondents, who 
were completely unaided in this. The data was 
subsequently analysed and summarized by the 
SPSS statistical program.
Results
27 valid questionnaires were received and analyzed. 
Questionnaires were received from 12 medical 
doctors, 6 nurses and 9 healthcare professionals. 
16 participants were female while 11 were male. 
14 participants worked in a hospital, 5 in a health 
centre, 1 in a laboratory, 2 in an academic institu-
tion, 1 in a public healthcare institution and 4 in a 
private healthcare institution. In terms of academic 
education, 23 respondents had a BSc and 4 had an 
MSc. Also, 16 had some informatics’ proficiency, 7 
had had some informatics’ education and 3 had had 
none (1 respondent did not answer this question).
The questionnaire was divided into four sec-
tions and was based on the categories generated 
from the focus groups’ discussions. The question-
naire was designed to further explore some the 
issues that are more relevant to this study. Section 
1 contained 9 generic questions regarding EMR; 
Section 2 had 11 questions regarding access con-
trol to EMR; Section 3 had 4 questions about a 
fictitious scenario of patients using an Automatic 
Teller Machine to access their medical records; 
and Section 4 had 7 demographic questions.
The answers obtained from Section 1 of the 
questionnaire showed that 21 HCP had used EMR 
during the course of their work whilst 6 respon-
dents never had and 17 HCP used the EMR daily 
or almost every day whilst 3 used EMR between 
1 and 3 times per week. The responses from the 
second set of questions focused on those 21 re-
spondents that have used EMR during the course 
of their work. 19 respondents said they logged 
in to the EMR with a password, 4 of them used 
passwords together with biometrics, 1 respondent 
used biometrics alone and 1 did not use any kind 
of mechanism.
Table 7 summarises the responses from the 
most common issues when users authenticate 
to the EMR with username and password. 15 
said this mechanism was easy to use, 4 said they 
usually share their usernames and passwords, 3 
continually forget their passwords and 2 had no 
opinion on the subject.
Discussion
Although many references were made during the 
focus groups’ discussions in relation to sharing 
passwords as a common practice amongst the 
healthcare professionals, only 4 people from the 
21 that use EMR for their work agreed that they 
share passwords. This can mean that when people 
are asked about the fact itself they may not want to 
refer it as something they do but when discussing 
it on an informal way amongst other professionals, 
this is regularly mentioned, even if in the third 
person as “something that happens regularly”.
Again, healthcare processes and workflows 
need to be analysed in depth so this issue can be 
tackled and corrected according to user needs and 
goals when using the systems.
disCussion and 
reCommendations
interpretation of the studies
The studies showed that healthcare professionals 
are aware of what happens in practice and that shar-
ing passwords is a common behaviour. Although 
Table 7. Issues regarding the use of login and 
password as authentication mechanisms 
Issues of login-password No of respondents
Accesses easily 15
Shares passwords 4
Forgets many times 3
No opinion 2
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some see it as a wrong behaviour others feel that it 
can be a useful strategy to fasten and facilitate the 
team work. The use of passwords as an authenti-
cation mechanism is very easy to implement and 
use but may not be the most efficient mechanism 
to protect information. It is also very difficult to 
control, in practice, who shares passwords with 
whom since the records can only show the iden-
tity that accessed and when. This means only an 
identity can be verified and not who physically 
accessed the system. A brief study of the access 
control logs can be one first step to verify if this 
problem may or may not exist. If the problem is 
suspected to exist, then other measures can be 
introduced according to the system’s objectives 
and security level. These measures are further 
discussed in this section where some technical 
and well as social and cultural recommendations 
are presented.
how to reduce password sharing
The issue of password sharing can be addressed 
from two different perspectives. One is the tech-
nological perspective; the other is the human 
perspective. Whilst different technologies can 
be used to help to stop the problem of password 
sharing, without the active involvement of the 
human users, many technological solutions might 
fail. Consequently this section will first address 
the human aspects of password sharing, and then 
it will turn to the different technologies that might 
be used to help to address the issue.
Social and Cultural Suggestions
It is abundantly clear that password sharing can 
only be reduced through the active involvement 
of the human users. Unless users are willing to 
acknowledge that password sharing is a problem 
that needs to be addressed, then little progress 
will be made in eradicating it (other than by tech-
nologically eliminating the need for passwords). 
EMR are a critical resource to organizations in 
the health sector. If these records were to become 
publicly available and broadcast on the Internet, or 
were to be tampered with by intruders without the 
knowledge of the health care professionals, this 
could have life threatening consequences to the 
patients. They thus need to be strongly protected.
• A critical success factor in reducing pass-
word sharing is therefore user education 
(Adams & Sasse, 1999). Primarily users 
need to be informed why password shar-
ing is a problem. If the users do not per-
ceive that a problem exists, then they will 
not be motivated to address it. The educa-
tor needs to explain to the users that com-
puter resources and the information that is 
stored on them are valuable resource to the 
organization;
• Part of the task of user education is to instil 
in users the fact that this principle should 
apply to all the computer accounts that 
they possess, and not just to their bank ac-
counts. Consequently users should not di-
vulge to third parties their usernames and 
passwords of any accounts that grant ac-
cess to computer systems;
• Organizations need to have detailed audit 
trails recording who accessed and pro-
cessed which information and when. If 
there is a breach in the security, it is the au-
dit trail that will inform that and lead back 
to the source of the breach. (For example, 
a doctor or a patient will not usually know 
if some unauthorized person read or copied 
the patient’s medical record, but the audit 
trail should have a record of this. If each 
access is uniquely recorded in the audit 
trail, and each user has a unique account 
protected by its own username and pass-
word, then the audit trail can lead us back 
to the user account which was responsible 
for the breach in security);
• Clearly for non-sharing of passwords to 
be effective, organizations need to have 
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sensible policies for the allocation of new 
accounts to users, and simple procedures 
to follow that are not unduly onerous or 
deemed to be unnecessary;
• Staff should know how to apply for new 
accounts (so education is important) and 
the procedure should be fast and efficient, 
so as to not de-motivate staff. (Ideally this 
procedure will be one that is automatically 
carried out when a new member of staff 
joins the organization, and the account 
username and password will be issued 
along with keys to doors, uniforms and 
other equipment that is necessary for the 
person to perform their roles.
• The policies for new account creation 
should not be too restrictive or exclusive, 
otherwise users may be forced into sharing 
their passwords so that others who are re-
fused their own accounts, can still do their 
jobs in the normal way);
• If the organization is licensing software or 
services from third parties, and pays a li-
cense fee per user account, then the organi-
zation should purchase sufficient licenses 
so that all users can have their own account 
and consequently do not need to share the 
same account password. (Skimping or 
cheating on licenses will not encourage us-
ers to not share their account passwords on 
other accounts which are not so restricted);
• The culture of the organization may need 
to be addressed. A culture that allows staff 
to share confidential information between 
them without proper authorization will 
have difficulty in preventing its staff from 
sharing their usernames and passwords;
• The organization should also have a set of 
sanctions that are applied to staff who break 
the agreed norms of information protection 
and handling. Staff will be knowledgeable 
about the policies and correct procedures 
to follow, and will actively follow them;
• When passwords are lost or forgotten, 
which invariably they will be, there needs 
to be a simple, quick and efficient proce-
dure for replacing them. Some IT Help 
Desks find that password replacements are 
the single most costly procedure that is un-
dertaken, due to the scale of the problem. 
The administrator should have a single 
command that they can issue, which will 
automatically generate the new password, 
and print it off for the staff member to take 
away with them. This should be a random 
one-time use password that requires the 
user to register his/her own preferred and 
easy to remember password after using this 
newly generated password to login;
• The organization needs to have a clear 
and easy to understand password policy 
that is made known to staff and that has 
been agreed with them. Password poli-
cies should contain rules for the length 
and content of passwords, and the fre-
quency at which they should be changed. 
Sample password policies are available on 




But beware. Some organizations make 
impossible demands on their users. They 
require passwords to be strong, i.e. long, 
in a mixture of lower/upper case, numbers, 
letters and non-alphanumeric characters, 
so that they cannot be easily cracked, and 
they also require them to be changed fre-
quently to give hackers less time to crack 
them. This combination makes it extremely 
difficult for users to remember what their 
original strong passwords are (since they 
cannot be dictionary words), and the fre-
quent change of passwords means that if a 
user does eventually manage to memorize 
his password, then no sooner has he done 
this than the password has to be replaced 
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with another one. If passwords are to be 
very strong then they should be granted a 
long lifetime measured in years rather than 
months, since the time taken to crack them 
will typically be measured in millions of 
years;
• Users should not have to remember multi-
ple strong passwords as this is beyond their 
mental capacities. (Adams & Sasse, 1999) 
presents the results of a survey into user’s 
attitudes and perceptions of passwords, 
and reasons for why they often break the 
rules.
Technical Suggestions
Technology can help alleviate the problem of pass-
word sharing, by employing various techniques 
that either help users to stop sharing passwords, 
or remove the need to use passwords. In the for-
mer category we have single sign on systems and 
resource management mechanisms. In the latter 
category we have biometric authentication, and 
the use of various hardware devices that do not 
use conventional passwords for authentication.
Helping Users to not Share Passwords
There are several techniques that can be employed 
to discourage users from sharing their passwords:
• Single Sign On (SSO) is one option. With 
SSO, the user’s username and password 
are used to grant the user access to all (or 
as many as possible) of his accounts and 
applications. This has a number of benefits. 
Firstly it makes easier for users to move 
between systems, services and machines 
because once he has logged into the first 
of these, he can move seamlessly between 
them all without needing to login again. 
Clearly a user is unlikely to give his SSO 
username and password to a colleague, 
if this means his colleague is simultane-
ously granted access to all of his accounts. 
Secondly the use of just one SSO password 
encourages the user to utilize a much stron-
ger password comprising more characters 
and more entropy than in the case where 
the user is burdened with having to remem-
ber many different passwords for many ac-
counts. This adds to the overall security 
of the system. (However, SSO also has 
its disadvantages. One can regard SSO as 
the user putting all his computer account 
eggs into one basket – if an attacker gains 
access to one account he has access to all 
of them. Furthermore SSO is operation-
ally difficult to achieve since a user’s em-
ployer typically will not have access to all 
the user’s accounts and therefore is not in a 
position to enable SSO to all of them. SSO 
is also technically difficult to achieve. This 
is because most organizations will have a 
number of legacy systems and applications 
which will be very difficult and costly to 
provide with SSO functionality);
• Ensuring each system is scalable to the 
number of users that are envisaged is 
also an important factor in helping users to 
stop password sharing. If the system itself 
cannot support the number of current or 
envisaged users, then the system adminis-
trator will be forced to make multiple users 
share the same account and password;
• If the amount of resources that can be 
consumed by a single user account is 
limited, or is charged for, then this also 
discourages users from sharing their 
account passwords. For example, the ac-
count could have a maximum session time, 
or CPU usage. If a user is likely to be re-
stricted in his future actions because of 
the resources consumed by one of his col-
leagues to whom he has shared his account 
password, then the user will be less likely 
to share his password with others in future.
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Removing the Need for Passwords
Password based authentication is relatively easy 
for users to understand and use, and it is easy to 
implement. This is why password based systems 
are so prevalent today. However, from a security 
perspective, user passwords are a very poor au-
thentication technique. This is because passwords 
are easy to forge using password cracker software, 
they are easy to share, and users are usually 
unaware when they are stolen. Many alternative 
authentication techniques exist, which rely on 
either the biometric characteristics of the user or 
the user possessing a hardware token of some sort.
• There are many different biometric au-
thentication techniques in use today 
(Harris, 2003), which might rely on physi-
cal user characteristics, like fingerprints, 
voice or iris scanning, or behavioural char-
acteristics, like keystroke dynamics, point-
er dynamics or gait (Magalhães & Santos, 
2008), to name a few. Despite the charac-
teristic being used, they all share the fol-
lowing properties: universality (everyone 
should possess the characteristic; uniquely 
(no users share the same biometric char-
acteristic); continuity (the characteristic 
should remain unchanged); and must be 
measurable in computer terms (Jain & 
Ross, 2006). Observing these properties 
the biometric technique should be able to 
differentiate between one user and another.
• Various different types of hardware de-
vice can be used for user authentication. 
These rely on a secret computation being 
performed in the hardware, and the an-
swer is provided as the user’s authentica-
tion token to the system being accessed. 
The answer can be a onetime password or 
a digital signature. If the hardware device 
is something the user permanently needs 
to have in his possession, such as a mobile 
phone or identity card, then using this as 
the authentication hardware device makes 
it much less likely the user will share it. 
To stop hardware devices from being sto-
len and used by the thief they are usually 
protected with a PIN. The user has to enter 
the PIN into the device before it will reveal 
the secret to him. Entering the wrong PIN a 
small number of times will usually lock the 
device from further use. This is to protect 
it from being used by a thief who would 
otherwise try every PIN combination until 
he found the correct one.
ConClusion
This chapter presents a number of cases and 
experiences relating with password sharing in 
healthcare. The idea was to give an overview of 
what happens in practice and what may be able 
to be improved regarding this important issue. 
Further, the authors wanted to provide a set of 
suggestions to aid organizations in their quest to 
reduce the frequency of password sharing that is 
either surreptitiously or knowingly carried out by 
their employees. Whilst technical solutions can 
be employed, the most cost effective solutions 
are usually not technical but rather are social 
and cultural. The most important factor is user 
education. Users are typically intelligent rational 
human beings, and when something is properly 
and effectively communicated to them, such as 
the negative aspects of password sharing, they 
are usually willing to comply with the request to 
cease such activity.
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key terms and definitions
Authentication Mechanism: A mechanism 
that allows the users to identify and prove who 
they say they are to an information system (e.g. 
with a login and password).
Electronic Medical Record: A set of docu-
ments within an information system, containing 
clinical and administrative information, regard-
ing one particular patient in order to support the 
healthcare professional in his/her daily practice 
in treating the patient.
Information Security: Usually defined by 3 
characteristics: confidentiality – prevent access 
from unauthorized users; integrity – prevent 
modification from unauthorized users; availability 
– provide access to authorized users whenever is 
needed; as well as auditing – register and control 
of who does what within the system; and ac-
countability – make users responsible for what 
they did within the system. The last two are only 
possible if we can identify and trust that identities 
are not shared.
Login: A unique tag that identifies a user of an 
information system (it can be a number or a word).
Password Sharing: The act of giving the login 
and password to be used by another user and not 
keeping them private. In this way, users can act 
on other people’s behalf.
Password: A word or string of characters that 
is uniquely related with a login and proves the 
identity of a user to the information system (this 
piece of information has to be kept private and 
proves to the system that the user identified by 
that login and that password is who he says he is, 
because this combination is unique).
Privacy: The right an individual has of keep-
ing his/her information private. He/she controls 
who can access what. Confidentiality provides for 
privacy as it relates to the means and mechanisms 
put into place to guarantee that the information 
is kept private.
Security Breach: Security incident that vio-
lates the protection of some information. Violation 
may happen in terms of confidentiality (unauthor-
ized access), integrity (unauthorized modification) 
and availability of information (deny of access to 
the information) (e.g. password sharing can consti-
tute a breach of any of the characteristics above).
